The Soviet Union's Monster Mi-6 Helicopter Airliner

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Noise, Flight Experience, and Size of Soviet Helicopters

  • Several commenters compare noise levels: Mi-26 is described as “big transport aircraft loud” but not as punishing as a C‑130; others are surprised at how quiet some modern helicopters (e.g., coast guard) can be at low altitude.
  • First‑hand accounts describe Mi‑26’s sheer size as “almost unbelievable” for something that flies.
  • The Mi‑6 and especially the twin‑rotor Mi‑12 are noted for severe vibration/harmonic issues; video evidence shows start‑ups being aborted due to rocking. The Mi‑12’s early flight problems are attributed to complex feedback between cockpit floor vibrations and control inputs.

Safety of Large Helicopter Airliners

  • The 2002 Mi‑26 crash in Chechnya (heavily overloaded, then brought down by a missile into a minefield) is cited as the deadliest helicopter accident.
  • Some argue this illustrates why very large passenger helicopters are a bad idea: too many people in a fragile platform, especially under fire.
  • Others counter that casualty probability depends on total traffic and safety improvements over time, not just vehicle size.
  • There is broad agreement that helicopters are more fragile than fixed‑wing aircraft and operate lower and slower, making them easier to hit with smaller missiles and MANPADS.

Artillery, Doctrine, and Ukraine War Logistics

  • A large subthread shifts to current war doctrine: Russia is said to be producing artillery shells much faster and cheaper than NATO countries, aided by North Korean supplies.
  • Commenters note that NATO doctrine emphasizes air power and precision munitions rather than massive artillery use, which clashes with Ukraine’s Soviet‑style artillery‑heavy tactics.
  • Debate centers on whether Western production of missiles and shells can scale fast enough and whether reliance on expensive, slow‑to‑produce systems is strategically risky.

Russian Casualties, Culture, and Politics

  • Multiple comments argue Russia treats ordinary soldiers as expendable “quantity over quality,” citing meat‑wave assaults, shovels in close combat, and high monthly casualties.
  • Others respond that all states value soldiers mainly for their utility, with pilots and highly trained personnel typically more protected.
  • A long, polarized argument covers:
    • Whether post‑Soviet borders and the 1990s were “unfair” to Russia vs. a natural outcome of Soviet mismanagement.
    • Competing narratives about Crimea, Donbas, “separatists,” and whether there really was a Ukrainian civil war.
    • Comparisons of Russia’s unresolved imperial trauma to Germany’s post‑WWII reckoning, including disputes over Soviet war crimes (mass rape in Germany) and present‑day conduct in Ukraine.
    • Predictions about Russia’s economic sustainability under sanctions and whether it will be forced to negotiate or can hold occupied territories indefinitely.

Borders, Self‑Determination, and Double Standards

  • Commenters clash over self‑determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, Eastern Ukraine, and Moldova are invoked as examples where principles are applied selectively by both Russia and the West.
  • Some stress support for people over empires; others defend Russia’s claims based on language, ethnicity, or historical borders.
  • There is unresolved disagreement over whether Ukraine could have avoided war by earlier EU/NATO integration versus respecting Russian “red lines.”

Future VTOL Transport and Alternatives

  • On the original idea of large passenger helicopters and eVTOLs:
    • Economic viability is questioned; Soviet mega‑projects are framed as politically driven rather than market‑tested.
    • Current eVTOL concepts are seen as range‑limited, likely niche, and constrained by certification and piloting requirements.
    • Trains (especially electrified, possibly autonomous) are proposed as more sensible for short‑range intercity travel, though rail noise and US rail‑building politics are criticized.

Soviet Tech Ambition and Cold War Psychology

  • Several comments see Soviet “monster machines” as partly driven by a “that’ll show them” inferiority complex and a checklist mentality of what a “modern” power should have.
  • Others emphasize that many Soviet projects had pragmatic roots and produced real firsts (e.g., early space achievements), but that command economies lacked market feedback to stop uneconomic or prestige‑driven designs.