NASA says Boeing Starliner astronauts may fly home on SpaceX in 2025

Starliner status, risk, and options

  • Many see the mission as a near-total failure: thruster issues, helium leaks, missing autonomous undock/return configuration, and now likely crew return on SpaceX’s Crew Dragon in 2025.
  • NASA and Boeing reportedly disagree on risk: Boeing downplays it, some NASA engineers are said to be more concerned. NASA is seeking more data from ground tests to narrow a “wide band of uncertainty.”
  • Several argue that with Dragon available and well‑proven, returning crew on Starliner is an unnecessary risk; some suggest flying Starliner home uncrewed as the real test.
  • Others note NASA must always accept some risk and that, if Starliner were the only option, they’d probably fly it.

Certification, contract, and Boeing’s future

  • Debate over whether NASA will or should certify Starliner even if this flight returns uncrewed, given massive cost overruns and repeated test failures.
  • Fixed‑price contracts mean Boeing eats additional costs; some think this incentivizes cutting corners and political pressure to “declare success.”
  • Some expect Starliner’s cancellation; others think NASA will keep it for redundancy and to avoid sole dependence on SpaceX.
  • Legal/contract angle: Boeing can’t simply walk away; exit would likely require NASA‑led cancellation or litigation.

Broader industry and alternatives

  • Discussion of other potential LEO crew providers: Sierra Space/Dream Chaser (cargo first, crew later), Blue Origin (New Shepard experience; possible capsule), Northrop Grumman (Cygnus‑derived), and Orion for LEO as an overkill fallback.
  • Several note Russia/Soyuz as the only immediate non‑SpaceX option, but politics and landing in Russia are complicating factors.

Astronaut experience and safety culture

  • Mixed speculation on astronaut feelings: extra time in space as dream vs. concern over health, family separation, and trust in Boeing hardware.
  • Many stress that astronauts accept risk but rely on ground teams not to add avoidable risk.
  • Comparisons made to past NASA disasters (Challenger, Columbia, Apollo 1) and worries about management overruling engineers.

Views on SpaceX and Musk

  • Widely seen as technically superior and far ahead on reliability and cadence.
  • Some want NASA to limit dependence on a single, founder‑controlled company; others argue only performance should matter, not the CEO’s behavior or politics.