Ships keep moving through Hormuz despite strike
Ongoing attacks and closures in the Strait of Hormuz are exposing how difficult it has become for even the U.S. Navy to guarantee safe passage for commercial shipping, especially against cheap drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics launched from land. Commenters argue over whether this represents a military failure or a political one, noting that fully reopening the strait would likely require a costly ground campaign the U.S. is unwilling to wage, and that America’s broader role as global security guarantor is being questioned. Alongside strategy and reputation, they highlight the human and economic costs: vulnerable ship crews with little choice but to sail, soaring war-risk insurance premiums, and attempts to track sharply reduced traffic through contested data sources.
Overall assessment of the Hormuz situation
- Many argue the U.S. has failed at a classic naval mission: keeping a strategic strait open to shipping.
- Others counter that fully securing such a narrow, heavily armed chokepoint without land control was never realistic; the failure is political, not purely military.
- A recurring theme: “we could do it, but only at unacceptable cost” (large raids or ground presence, massive interceptor use, broad strikes), which some see as equivalent to failure under real-world constraints.
Drones, missiles, and modern naval limits
- Cheap drones, cruise missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, small boats, and mines make sustained protection extremely costly.
- Defensive ships quickly deplete limited interceptor magazines under saturation attacks.
- Debate over whether the U.S. Navy underestimated Iranian drone/missile capability or political leaders ignored realistic assessments.
- Several see this as proof that traditional “control of sea lanes” is obsolete without dominant land and air control.
Political leadership, strategy, and U.S. role
- Strong criticism of U.S. leadership for launching a war without willingness to commit to the scale needed to win militarily.
- Some frame the outcome as a strategic defeat worse than Vietnam, damaging deterrence and encouraging others to bypass or replace U.S. security guarantees.
- Discussion about whether the U.S. should or will retreat from global hegemon role, and who might fill the vacuum.
Shipping, crews, and insurance
- Some traffic continues because of economic pressure and crew vulnerability; mariners can be effectively trapped or coerced.
- Others stress insurers and risk premiums are the real gating factor; war-risk rates have surged before, and high premiums can halt traffic regardless of “openness.”
- Reports conflict on traffic levels; AIS-based trackers may undercount due to ships turning off transponders.
Legal and diplomatic framing
- Dispute over whether Iran’s closure and attacks violate maritime law and a U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding, especially given ongoing Israeli operations in Lebanon.
- One side emphasizes Iran’s lack of legal right to interfere with innocent passage; the other argues that in practice, power and wartime realities override legal niceties.
Proposed structural alternatives
- Proposal to reduce Hormuz reliance via westward Saudi pipelines to the Red Sea.
- Counterargument: above-ground or terminal infrastructure would still be vulnerable to Iranian drones and missiles, unless deeply hardened.