ASML says it sold 'absolutely nothing' in Europe in 2026

ASML, Europe’s largest tech firm and the world’s leading maker of advanced chipmaking equipment, reports it sold virtually no lithography machines in Europe in 2026, highlighting how little cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing remains on the continent. Commenters link this to regulatory hurdles, weak industrial coordination, and a focus on mature nodes and automotive chips rather than frontier fabs that use EUV technology. Many see the situation as a strategic vulnerability, especially given geopolitical risks around Russia and China–Taiwan, and contrast Europe’s stance with US efforts to re-shore advanced chip production via subsidies.

Geopolitics and War in Ukraine

  • Debate over EU strategy toward Russia:
    • One side blames “moral high horse” leaders for refusing talks with Putin and prolonging the war.
    • Others say if Europe were truly “hell bent” on defeating Russia, it would have massively ramped military aid; instead it half‑committed while still paying Russia for energy.
  • Disagreement on endgame:
    • Some argue diplomacy is the only realistic path given Russia’s nukes.
    • Others say Russia must be pushed out to deter future aggression, accepting that an attritional war could still be lost.
  • NATO/Article 5 is invoked as the real driver of unity against Russia, though Ukraine is not a NATO member; some emphasize moral and self‑interest obligations anyway.
  • Claims that wider war with Russia is “increasingly inevitable” are met with skepticism; cited sources include YouTube, which others call unreliable.

European Economic Strength vs “Europoor” Narrative

  • Several comments describe Europe as “poor,” overregulated, and declining; others counter with examples of strong sectors (Irish pharma/medtech, high salaries in tech hubs, robust social protections).
  • Migration statistics US↔Europe are debated; some argue more Europeans move to the US, others point to Americans relocating for lifestyle, healthcare, and perceived higher happiness.
  • Quality of life vs income trade‑offs are a recurring theme.

Semiconductors, ASML, and Industrial Capacity

  • Consensus that Europe has very limited leading‑edge fabs; current and planned European fabs mostly use mature (cheaper) tools, not EUV/High‑NA, which hurts ASML’s high‑end sales locally.
  • Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China) dominates ASML demand; US is important but only a minority of sales.
  • Europe is seen as weak in advanced chip design and especially packaging, making full “made in Europe” chips rare. Some see this as a strategic vulnerability.
  • US CHIPS Act is cited as a contrast: heavy subsidies to reshore both fabs and packaging; EU’s own efforts are viewed as slower and less coherent.

Regulation, Energy, and Industrial Policy

  • One camp blames EU regulations, environmental rules, and bureaucratic delays for driving fabs and heavy industry elsewhere; another argues Europe still hosts plenty of critical manufacturing and that regulation is not the main cause.
  • Energy constraints and rationing in some countries are mentioned, but others note that equally energy‑poor states (e.g., in Asia) sustain large fab capacity.
  • Ireland is highlighted as a counterexample: strict planning and environmental rules, yet massive Intel investments, helped by very business‑friendly policymaking and tax structures.
  • Coordination problems between EU/national/local levels and “decadent” short‑term politics are cited as deeper structural issues.

Strategic Dependence and Security Concerns

  • Worries that Europe is over‑dependent on Russian energy and Chinese steel/cars/semiconductor equipment, while its own car and steel industries erode.
  • Some argue buying cheaper foreign steel is rational commodity economics; others stress steel as a strategic input needed in wartime.
  • Several comments portray Europe as an “amusement park” or “lost continent” drifting toward dependency; others strongly contest this, pointing to existing high‑value manufacturing and tech ecosystems.