Zelensky says Russia has widened attacks to hit Ukraine's data centres

Current military situation and attacks on Kyiv

• Commenters stress that drone and missile strikes on Kyiv have been routine for years and are not evidence of Russian ground advances; ground lines are largely static with only incremental changes.
• Kyiv is not seen as under threat of ground assault, but under sustained air and missile pressure.

Drone and missile capabilities vs. defenses

• Russian drones now include jet‑powered, long‑range (hundreds to ~1000 km) systems, often launched in large numbers; only a few typically reach cities, but do so frequently.
• Ballistic missiles are described as particularly destructive because Ukraine lacks sufficient Patriot PAC‑3 and other anti‑ballistic systems.
• Some blame past US political decisions for Ukraine’s current air‑defense gaps.

Targeting data centers and infrastructure

• Russia is reported to be widening strikes to Ukrainian data centers; some argue these are dual‑use and legitimate military targets, others frame such attacks as terrorism.
• Debate over whether Ukraine should retaliate against Russian data centers: some advocate it; others argue planners likely prioritize more critical logistics and energy targets.
• Historical analogy (Battle of Britain) is used to warn against tit‑for‑tat that shifts focus away from militarily decisive targets.

War duration, escalation, and mobilization

• Disagreement on Russia’s remaining capacity to “escalate”: some say both sides are near their conventional limits; others point to potential full mobilization and missile production growth.
• Several note Russian logistics problems (even starving front‑line troops) and limited ability to equip mass conscription.
• Long‑term Western support is debated: some say Europe cannot sustain large aid forever; others argue $100B/year is small relative to NATO budgets and strategically worthwhile.

Nuclear deterrence and European security

• One strain argues Putin cannot or will not end the war and may be willing to use nukes; therefore Europe should build its own broad nuclear arsenal.
• Others counter that offensive nuclear use would be suicidal under MAD and that “everyone gets nukes” is dangerous and unrealistic; timelines for new nuclear powers are disputed.

Drone production, logistics, and attack pacing

• Question: why not hit “everything at once”?
  • Answers: limited production of long‑range drones/missiles, high interception rates, and the need to stockpile for large swarms.
  • Coordinated deep strikes are complex; many missions serve to probe defenses and degrade air defense over time.
• Conflicting views on Russian supply: some say US strikes on Iranian Shahed facilities degraded capacity; others claim Russia is now self‑sufficient and has improved designs, with China supplying key components indirectly.

Civilian targeting, genocide claims, and narratives

• Multiple comments assert Russia systematically targets civilian infrastructure (power, dams, schools, housing, cultural sites) and kidnaps children, characterizing the campaign as genocidal.
• Others ask for careful sourcing on extreme claims and note that both sides wage information warfare.
• There is concern about pro‑Russian astroturfing and manipulation in online discussions.

Strategic value of the war for third parties

• Some argue Western support effectively lets Ukraine “wear down” Russian power and test modern drone/EW warfare without NATO casualties.
• Others criticize this as using Ukraine as a proxy battlefield and prolonging its destruction, even if they still support aid.

Future of data center infrastructure

• A side thread speculates that wartime targeting may push critical data centers underground for protection.
• “Data centers in space” are largely dismissed as fantasy: launch, cooling, and radiation make them costly, though some note power‑generation advantages in orbit.