As much as you ever wanted to know about 155M artillery shell production

Historical context & Ukraine war parallels

• Several comments compare Ukraine to WWI: heavy artillery, trenches, fortifications, and grinding attrition, with airpower less decisive than in WWII-style doctrine.
• WWI is cited for the explosive growth in shell consumption and the evolution of tactics like creeping barrages and sophisticated fire patterns.
• Others see WWI and WWII as a single extended “Thirty Years’ War,” with current conflicts framed as repercussions of that era.

Drones, technology, and changing warfare

• FPV kamikaze drones in Ukraine are highlighted as a new mass-produced weapon (goal of 1M units in 2024), shifting some roles away from artillery.
• Drone surveillance and cheap loitering munitions are seen as major factors making offense harder and favoring entrenched defense.

Ethics, pacifism, and deterrence

• Some argue that any weapon development is morally suspect (“never build a weapon you wouldn’t want used on you”).
• Others call this view naive or privileged, stressing that countries like Ukraine cannot opt out of war; a strong “war machine” is portrayed as necessary for deterrence and survival.
• There is debate over whether “appeasement” can ever work; some say not with Russia, others argue diplomacy (even if called appeasement) can sometimes succeed.

NATO, diplomacy, and responsibility

• One line of argument blames Western policy (NATO expansion, Minsk accords’ handling) for provoking Russia; Mearsheimer-style views are both cited and strongly criticized.
• Counterarguments stress that Russia is the clear aggressor, repeatedly violates agreements, and aims at large-scale conquest, making Ukrainian resistance necessary.
• Disagreement over whether Ukraine “missed” a viable neutrality deal early in 2022; some see it as a real option, others as a stalling tactic by Russia.

Artillery economics & industrial capacity

• Thread centers on how US/EU 155mm shell production atrophied due to low peacetime demand, short contracts, environmental and safety regulations, and a shift toward airpower and precision munitions.
• Commenters note that industry wants 10–15 year contracts; current 3–4 year deals don’t justify new factories.
• Some think low capacity is good (less ability to wage war); others argue it’s dangerously short-sighted given Ukraine-like conflicts.
• 3D printing is discussed: useful for prototyping or niche parts but seen as unsuitable for high-volume, low-margin artillery bodies.

Missiles, naval warfare, and “magazine fights”

• Multiple posts argue future peer wars will be dominated by missile salvos and drone swarms, turning into “magazine fights” where both sides rapidly exhaust interceptors.
• Concerns that US ships can’t reload vertical launch systems at sea and might run out of missiles early.
• Directed-energy weapons (lasers/DEWs) are proposed as cheap defensive layers, though commenters note limitations: short range, weather, and hardened electronics.
• Debate over whether US carrier groups would be quickly neutralized by mass anti-ship missiles; some think carriers and large surface ships are drifting toward obsolescence.

Nuclear weapons & Ukraine’s disarmament

• One camp argues nukes are the true “shield”; nuclear states don’t get invaded, while conventional stockpiles matter mainly in proxy wars.
• Others respond that nukes haven’t stopped nuclear states from bullying non-nuclear ones.
• Ukraine’s post-Soviet nukes: some say Ukraine could never truly use them (no launch codes, high maintenance cost); others counter that with local expertise and infrastructure, a nuclear capability could have been developed, though it would have been expensive.
• There is no consensus on whether retained Ukrainian nukes would have deterred Russia.

Russian vs Western shell production

• A question is raised why Russia, under sanctions, can produce shells at several times the Western rate.
• Explanations offered: Russia’s greater political will, 24/7 production, looser environmental and safety constraints, and the fact that artillery remains central in its doctrine.
• Some note Russia’s tech requirements are closer to mid-20th-century industry, which they can still support.

Regulation, civilians, and “arsenal of democracy”

• US legal barriers (ATF rules, destructive-device regulations) and safety constraints are cited as making private or ad-hoc energetics work difficult, unlike in past decades.
• The broader theme is that the post-Cold War “arsenal of democracy” hollowed out: fine for decades of low-intensity conflicts, but inadequate for sustained, high-burn-rate wars like Ukraine.