First planned small nuclear reactor plant in the US has been canceled

Cancellation of NuScale’s flagship small modular reactor project in Idaho has intensified scrutiny of nuclear power’s economics, with projected costs rising to roughly three to five times those of new solar in some estimates. Commenters debate whether next‑generation reactors can ever compete with ever-cheaper renewables plus storage, noting financing costs, regulatory burden, and the lack of a clear nuclear “learning curve” after decades of subsidies. Others argue that dispatchable low‑carbon power is still needed alongside wind and solar, but many see batteries, hydrogen, and grid expansion as more promising complements than unproven SMR designs.

Economics of SMRs and Nuclear

  • The canceled NuScale project is seen as evidence that current SMRs are not cost‑competitive: projected costs rose from ~$5.3B to $9.3B for 6×77 MW, with levelized costs needing a ~55% cut just to reach ~$89/MWh, still above market power.
  • Several commenters argue that even this target is 3–5× typical solar costs, and that nuclear generally has high OPEX (staffing, fuel cycle, decommissioning) on top of high CAPEX.
  • Others note SMRs are first-of-a-kind; factory repetition could lower costs but requires huge upfront volume and long-term subsidies with no guarantee of catching up to renewables.
  • Some point to naval reactors as proof small reactors can be industrialized, but acknowledge military economics and fuel choices are not directly transferable.

Renewables, Storage, and Grid Reliability

  • Many argue that solar and wind plus existing gas plants already form a cheaper, practical “90% decarbonization” path, with gas used as fast-ramping backup.
  • Storage options discussed: lithium-ion (increasingly viable), iron‑air batteries, pumped hydro, hydrogen, e‑fuels, gravity concepts. Consensus: pumped hydro is proven; most others are early or niche but improving.
  • Critics say renewables’ low prices often ignore the cost of firm backup; supporters counter that storage and demand response are progressing and that curtailed power can be used to make fuels (H₂, synthetic hydrocarbons).

Transmission and Land Use

  • Long-distance high‑voltage DC transmission is technically feasible with modest losses (~3%/1000 km) and already used in places like China and Brazil, but is expensive and politically hard to build.
  • Land-use concerns for solar/wind are debated: some cite high area/MW, others respond that available land and rooftops are abundant and can be dual‑used (agrivoltaics, grazing, parking‑lot canopies).

Why Large Projects (Especially Nuclear) Are Hard to Build

  • Repeated themes: complex regulation, safety culture, site‑specific engineering, litigation, and now high interest rates all drive schedule slips and cost overruns.
  • Comparisons are drawn with much cheaper, faster‑deployed solar and wind, and with other megaprojects (transit, infrastructure) that also overrun.

Subsidies, Externalities, and Who Pays

  • Nuclear historically benefited from massive state support (especially via military programs) and still depends on subsidies, liability caps, and public handling of long‑term waste and decommissioning.
  • Renewables and fossil fuels are also heavily subsidized in various ways. Disagreement persists over which technology is “more subsidized” and how to account for pollution and climate damages.

Safety, Risk, Regulation, and Public Perception

  • One side emphasizes nuclear’s very low deaths per unit energy and argues regulation is excessively strict compared with far deadlier fossil fuels.
  • The other side stresses “black swan” nuclear accidents, long‑lived waste, and past management failures, and sees strict oversight and high costs as an appropriate trade‑off.
  • Several commenters think anti‑nuclear environmentalism historically increased fossil use; others counter that today nuclear’s main problem is simply economics versus ever‑cheaper renewables.