Availability and Use of F-35 Fighter Aircraft: An Update

Overall Assessment of the F‑35

• Discussion is split between seeing the F‑35 as a “complete success” and as an overcomplicated, under‑reliable “dog.”
• Supporters cite large export orders, falling unit prices, and advanced sensors/stealth as evidence it’s a generation ahead of F‑16/Gripen/Rafale.
• Skeptics emphasize low availability, fewer flight hours than older fighters, rapid degradation with age, and high operating costs.

Multirole vs Specialized Aircraft

• Central dispute: Is the F‑35 a “jack of all trades, master of none” or a valuable general‑purpose platform?
• Critics argue trying to cover too many roles (CAS, air superiority, carrier ops, VTOL, strike) weakens performance in each, contrasting it with more focused aircraft (A‑10, F‑22).
• Defenders counter that a 5th‑gen “jack of all trades” can still outperform specialized 4th‑gen planes overall.

Close Air Support (CAS) Debate

• Long, detailed argument comparing F‑35/F‑16 vs A‑10 for CAS.
• A‑10 praised for survivability at low altitude, huge gun ammo load, and cost‑effective strafing against many targets.
• Others argue modern CAS relies on precision munitions from higher altitude due to MANPADS/short‑range air defenses; strafing seen as too dangerous and not clearly cheaper when full lifecycle costs and training are included.
• Disagreement over definitions: some conflate CAS with low altitude; others stress it’s about proximity to friendly forces, not height.

Air Superiority and Combat Relevance

• Stealth and first‑shot advantage viewed as F‑35’s key strength; if it kills opponents before detection, dogfighting performance matters less.
• Counterpoint: F‑22 is better at pure air superiority and was still curtailed, suggesting limited demand for that role.
• Lack of symmetric, high‑end combat (e.g., against modern IADS and peer fighters) leaves many claims unproven.

Reliability, Availability, and Usage

• Charts from the article show F‑35s are less available and flown less than F‑15/F‑18, with availability declining faster over time.
• Some attribute this to “teething problems” of a new, complex design; others note F‑35A availability falling below F‑22 as a serious red flag.
• Wartime vs peacetime maintenance standards discussed: in war, aircraft would fly more, with more risk accepted and more intensive maintenance/cannibalization.

Allies, Politics, and Procurement

• Many European purchases framed as driven not just by performance, but by:
  • NATO interoperability and shared logistics.
  • Political/strategic ties with the US.
  • Industrial offsets and local production.
• Commenters note similar logic in other deals (e.g., Poland–South Korea for tanks), and that “desirability” includes politics, not just specs.
• Some argue demand also reflects US geopolitical influence; others object to implying customers are coerced into inferior equipment.

Software, Electronics, and Upgrades

• Software highlighted as a major selling point but also a major problem: many bugs, delayed tech refresh (TR3), and slow integration of Block 4 capabilities.
• New F‑35s with upgraded hardware have been delivered but grounded or flown with partial software capability.
• Some see this as inevitable complexity of integrating advanced, networked systems; others worry incentives favor cost growth and persistent bugginess.

Variants and Roles (A/B/C)

• Clarification:
  • F‑35A for conventional runways,
  • F‑35B for STOVL (Marine/short deck),
  • F‑35C for carrier operations.
• Some feel the program should have been split into more distinct aircraft, especially separating the STOVL B variant to reduce design compromises.