Unbricking my MacBook took an email to Tim Cook
Apple’s activation lock and “Find My” features are praised for deterring theft but criticized for turning recovered or second‑hand devices into unfixable “bricks” when ownership can’t be cryptographically proven. Commenters argue over whether strong anti-theft measures and serialized parts justify the resulting e‑waste, repair barriers, and dependence on Apple to regain access, especially when support channels fail and escalation to executives becomes the only remedy. Broader themes include who truly “owns” modern hardware, whether real‑world identity should be tied to devices, and if users should have their own keys or hardware tokens to override corporate control.
Activation Lock, Theft Deterrence, and Abuse
- Many see Activation Lock as an effective deterrent: stolen iPhones/Macs become low‑value “bricks,” reducing casual theft and targeted phone snatching compared to the 2000s.
- Others argue thieves still steal iPhones en masse (e.g., Faraday bags at events) and feed organized crime and overseas chop-shops; anti-theft mainly inconveniences honest owners.
- A key failure in the OP’s case: the device was not enrolled in Find My, so a thief (or repair shop) could wipe it, attach it to a new account, and then use Find My to brick it.
- Some call this “working as intended”: without an existing ownership binding, Apple cannot know whether the physical possessor or original buyer is legitimate.
- Critics say this creates a denial‑of‑service risk: any later possessor can permanently lock the hardware, even when the original buyer can show proof of purchase.
Ownership, Keys, and Control
- Strong sentiment that “not your keys, not your device”: if Apple controls the root keys and activation infrastructure, users never truly own their machines.
- Counter‑argument: legal ownership is determined by law and courts, not cryptographic keys; Apple’s systems must operate within property law and anti‑fraud constraints.
- Suggested alternatives:
- Device‑tied hardware or paper “master keys” shipped in the box or via HSM/dongle.
- Optional e‑fuse / permanent “no anti‑theft” mode for users who reject remote control.
- Stronger user education in setup about consequences of skipping Find My.
Privacy, Identity Binding, and Government ID
- Some argue the real fix is binding devices/accounts to government‑issued ID to enable strong recovery and prevent lockout abuses.
- Others strongly oppose tying hardware to real‑world identity, citing privacy, surveillance, and exclusion of those without IDs.
- For privacy‑sensitive users (journalists, activists), continuous tracking via Find My is seen as risky; some note you can enable activation lock while disabling location, but trust in Apple’s implementation is debated.
Support, Escalation, and Power Asymmetry
- The fact that an email to the CEO’s office can bypass standard policy is seen as:
- A useful “course‑correction” path for edge cases.
- Evidence that Apple can override Activation Lock but refuses to at normal support levels.
- Several commenters generalize this to a broader problem: giant companies offload risk to customers, provide weak first‑line support, and only fix egregious cases when reputationally exposed.