Anselm's Ontological Argument: A Guide for the Perplexed

Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God — the idea that a “greatest conceivable being” must exist in reality and not just in the mind — is critiqued here as logically flawed, linguistically confused, and easily parodied (e.g., with perfect islands, unicorns, or even Santa). Commenters explore classic objections such as Kant’s claim that “existence is not a predicate,” the clash between omniscience and omnipotence, and the worry that such reasoning proves too much and thus proves nothing. Others argue it remains worth studying for its historical significance, its role in teaching concepts like modal logic and ontology, and for what its repeated reformulation by major thinkers reveals about human reasoning, even as they point to cosmological or experiential arguments as more plausible routes to theism.

Perceived flaws in Anselm’s ontological argument

  • Many commenters find the argument “just bad” even in steelmanned form.
  • Core objections: “greater than all things” is meaningless or ill‑defined; assumes what it tries to prove; confuses concepts in the mind with things in reality.
  • The move from “can be conceived” + “existence is greater than non‑existence” to “therefore exists” is widely rejected.
  • Some argue you can plug in anything (“perfect teapot,” “perfect unicorn,” “perfect island”) and “prove” its existence, showing the form is defective.

Why philosophers and theologians still discuss it

  • Defenders say it was serious in its historical context and influenced later thought.
  • It is used pedagogically to introduce distinctions like existence “in the mind” vs “in reality,” and the critique that “existence is not a predicate.”
  • Others see it as a window into medieval metaphysics (logos, language as reality) and into how very smart people can go wrong.

Language, logic, and existence

  • Debate over whether the argument treats language as fundamental to reality rather than a model of it.
  • Disagreement on whether “existence” is a property at all, or a higher‑order notion.
  • Some stress the difference between defining a term (nominal definition) and grasping an essence in reality (real definition).
  • Questions raised about whether “greatness” forms any coherent ordering across all properties.

Parodies and logical counter‑moves

  • Numerous reductios: perfect islands, aliens, universes, or even a necessarily non‑existent God.
  • Jokes and thought experiments (e.g., “existing Santa”) illustrate that packing “existing” into a definition doesn’t yield genuine existence.
  • Some suggest the argument is analogous to notorious set‑theoretic paradoxes where naive comprehension over predicates fails.

Alternative arguments about God

  • Several commenters prefer cosmological or Aristotelian‑style “first cause / first mover” arguments, or arguments from contingency and experience.
  • Others argue that any such “proofs” either undercut faith or at best point to an abstract necessary being, not a specific religious deity.
  • Some hold that omniscience and omnipotence are themselves logically incompatible, making a traditional God impossible.