What Happened to GE? (2021)

General Electric’s long decline is traced to aggressive financial engineering, short‑termism, and a Welch-era management culture that prized “success theater,” stack-ranked layoffs, and Six Sigma bureaucracy over long-term product and R&D investment. Commenters link GE’s fate to a broader U.S. shift from manufacturing to finance-driven conglomerates, arguing that shareholder-value maximization, cooked-but-legal accounting, and Wall Street pressures hollowed out industrial strength. The thread also touches on GE’s post-breakup remnants, brand licensing quirks like GE Appliances now being owned by Haier, and what GE’s story implies for today’s giants that pursue similar strategies.

Perceived causes of GE’s decline

  • Many commenters blame a long-term shift from engineering and R&D toward short-term profit optimization, services, and finance.
  • GE Capital is seen as turning GE into “a financial firm that happens to make things,” amplifying risk and masking underlying weakness.
  • Conglomerate complexity made it hard for leadership and boards to understand risks and operations across units.

Jack Welch, culture, and incentives

  • Welch’s era is portrayed as pivotal: stack-ranked firings, intense internal competition, and “success theater” around quarterly numbers.
  • Several argue this culture rewarded book-cooking, information hoarding, and optics over substance, damaging long-term innovation.
  • Some see him as emblematic of a broader 1980s–1990s MBA/Wall Street ideology focused on shareholder value above all else.
  • Others note he was technically not an MBA and had deep internal experience, suggesting the story is more nuanced.

Accounting practices and “financial engineering”

  • Discussion centers on asset sales/leasebacks and similar structures used to smooth or boost quarterly earnings.
  • Some call this effectively fraud if used to pad earnings without clear disclosure; others note such transactions can be legitimate risk or capital management.
  • Commenters highlight how widespread such financial engineering is in large public companies and how incentives drive it.

GE Appliances and brand perception

  • Several are surprised that innovative new appliances under the GE brand are now made by a different owner, not the original company.
  • The brand sale to a foreign manufacturer leads to confusion: some think quality improved after the sale, others share negative reliability anecdotes across brands (GE, Samsung, LG, Maytag).

Six Sigma and exported management fads

  • GE’s Six Sigma push is widely criticized as “quality theater”: elaborate programs, certifications, and storyboards with limited real impact.
  • Former employees describe it as distracting talent into process rituals rather than meaningful engineering or product work.
  • Some see GE as having “exported” these fads to other corporations via ex-employees and consultants.

Broader commentary on US industry and markets

  • Multiple comments generalize GE’s story to US deindustrialization and a “financialized” economy where companies primarily serve capital markets.
  • Debate over whether conglomerates can work long-term: some say they inevitably fail; others point to Japanese groups, industrial giants, and holding companies as counterexamples (often with lower returns or different shareholder structures).
  • Public markets are portrayed as pressuring firms toward short-term metrics, recurring-revenue models, and financial tricks at the expense of product quality and manufacturing excellence.

Stock behavior and technical points

  • Some confusion over GE’s apparent recent share-price recovery is clarified as largely an artifact of an 8:1 reverse split.
  • Adjusted for splits and inflation, commenters note the long-run destruction of shareholder value since GE’s 2000 peak.

Reactions to the article’s framing

  • Several think the article underplays leadership culpability, especially in downplaying Welch’s role.
  • Others appreciate that it highlights systemic issues: complexity, bad incentive design, optimism bias toward “good news,” and mismanaged diversification.
  • There is disagreement over how much weight to put on a single leader versus broader structural and macroeconomic forces.