What Boeing did to all the guys who remember how to build a plane
Boeing’s safety and quality crises are widely traced to a decades‑long shift from engineering‑led culture to finance‑driven management after the McDonnell Douglas merger. Commenters describe how veteran engineers and machinists were pushed out to cut costs, quality control was hollowed out or outsourced, and regulators like the FAA increasingly relied on Boeing to police itself, culminating in failures such as the 737 MAX crashes and recent in‑flight incidents. Many see this as a broader symptom of short‑term shareholder value, weak oversight, and the systematic devaluation of institutional knowledge across critical industries.
Boeing’s Decline and Management Culture
- Many tie the cultural break to the McDonnell Douglas merger and later CEOs from finance/GE-style backgrounds.
- Shift from “product/engineering first” to “spreadsheet/stock price first” is seen as core: outsourcing, offshoring, stock buybacks, headcount cuts, union‑busting.
- Senior engineers and machinists were characterized as overpaid “obstacles” and pushed out; management roles and generic “leadership” were prized over deep technical skill.
Institutional Knowledge, QA, and “Quality Inertia”
- Commenters stress how badly short‑term cost‑cutting undervalues tacit expertise and “tribal knowledge.”
- QA and safety functions were hollowed out or pushed onto line workers, while metrics were gamed to show fewer defects.
- Concept of “quality inertia”: decades of prior excellence mask rot for a long time; the system can run on old margins until failures cluster years later.
Regulation, Market Structure, and Shareholder Incentives
- FAA oversight is criticized as captured and delegated back to Boeing; some question what purpose it now serves.
- Duopoly with Airbus and huge demand means airlines “have to” buy Boeing, muting market punishment.
- Many argue the stock market structurally rewards short‑term extraction; executives cash out before consequences. Others reply that markets still allocate capital better than state planning, but acknowledge short‑termism.
- Suggestions range from stronger safety fines and executive clawbacks to antitrust breakups and “long‑term” exchanges.
Safety Perception and Actual Risk
- Some insist US airline flying is still very safe relative to driving and that multiple defense layers remain.
- Others argue the 737 MAX crashes and recent structural failures reset the “safety clock”; luck (e.g., empty seats at the blown‑out door) is doing too much work.
Whistleblower Death and Corporate Retaliation
- Strong agreement that whistleblowers faced retaliation, career destruction, and intense stress.
- On the recent whistleblower death, some see clear suicide driven by that pressure; others are suspicious given timing and incomplete public forensic detail. Both sides agree the case has a chilling effect.
Broader Parallels and Workforce Issues
- Repeated comparisons to tech, defense, healthcare, utilities, and other conglomerates hollowed out by financialization.
- Ageism and the purging of older, more expensive staff is seen as widespread (including in software).
- A minority argue diversity/DEI is to blame; most responses in the thread instead point to capitalism, incentives, and management ideology, not workforce demographics.