Boeing faces new US investigation into 'missed' 787 inspections

Allegations that Boeing falsified or skipped required safety inspections on its 787 Dreamliner jets have intensified concerns over the company’s safety culture and regulatory oversight, especially given its role in carrying millions of passengers and supplying the U.S. military. Commenters argue that decades of cost-cutting, self-certification, and a shift from engineering-led to finance-driven management have produced systemic rot that ordinary fines or leadership shuffles may not fix. Proposals range from stricter criminal liability for executives and ending self-regulation to nationalization or forced restructuring, amid broader worries that other critical industries might harbor similar, less visible failures.

Systemic Rot vs. Isolated Failures

  • Many see Boeing as “rotten to the core,” with falsified inspections and long‑term erosion of a once-strong safety/engineering culture.
  • Others argue this is amplified by current scrutiny, but still reflects years of stock-price‑driven cost-cutting and outsourcing.
  • A minority view suggests similar mismatches between paperwork and reality are endemic in many industries; Boeing’s failures just exposed it.

Too Big to Fail, Nationalization, and Restructuring

  • Boeing is widely seen as “too big to fail” due to its role in commercial aviation and as a key defense contractor.
  • Proposals:
    • Nationalize Boeing, replace leadership with engineers, then later re-privatize.
    • Force bankruptcy via fines, then have the government buy and restructure it.
    • Break out or reverse the McDonnell Douglas merger (some doubt this is feasible or helpful).
  • Others highlight legal and political barriers: “takings” issues, shareholder wipeout, and lack of US appetite for nationalization.

Regulation, Self-Regulation, and Criminal Liability

  • Strong criticism of FAA’s delegation of certification/inspection to Boeing; seen as a deregulation failure.
  • Broad skepticism of industry self-regulation, with Boeing cited as a proof point that it “of course” goes bad.
  • Suggestions:
    • Personal criminal liability for ignoring safety issues, up to the board.
    • Stronger, better-funded independent regulators, not corporate self-certification.
  • Some note other sectors (pharma, oil, shipping, finance) with serious safety or ethics failures, reinforcing distrust of self-policing.

Incentives, Cost-Cutting, and Management Culture

  • Repeated theme: shareholder pressure and cost-cutting trump safety; “accountants beat engineers,” especially post‑merger.
  • Outsourcing and subcontracting seen as ways to cut cost and offload blame (e.g., software vendors, suppliers).
  • Concern that Boeing management will scapegoat individual employees for falsified inspections rather than address systemic incentives.

Safety Perception and Risk Comparisons

  • Several commenters are personally uneasy about flying Boeing aircraft.
  • Debate over whether aviation remains far safer than driving, with disagreements about the right metrics (per trip, mile, or hour).
  • Consensus: current failures may not yet show up in aggregate stats but could rapidly erode safety if uncorrected.