A Partisan Solution to Partisan Gerrymandering: The Define–Combine Procedure
A new “Define–Combine” redistricting procedure, inspired by fair cake-cutting, is proposed as a way for two opposing parties to draw legislative maps that limit partisan gerrymandering without relying on a neutral commission. Commenters examine its game-theoretic claims, potential exploits (like exotic district geometries), dependence on a strict two-party system, and lack of hard optimality proofs under real geography. Many argue that while such technical schemes can modestly curb abuses, deeper reforms like proportional representation, larger legislatures, or different voting systems may address the incentives behind gerrymandering more effectively.
Nature of the proposal and analysis
- Seen as part of modern, computational political science; relates to cake‑cutting (“I cut, you choose”) and earlier fair-division redistricting ideas.
- Procedure: one party defines 2N small, contiguous, equal-population “subdistricts”; the other merges them into N districts.
- Authors rely heavily on simulations and a specific Markov-chain algorithm; an analytic solution exists for simplified settings, but full optimality under real geography is not proven.
Perceived strengths
- Attractive because it does not require a neutral commission; works even if both sides are “cynical” and self-interested.
- Simulations suggest only a small first-mover advantage (about one seat swing in examples).
- Can be adapted to protect Voting Rights Act majority‑minority districts by fixing those first, then applying the procedure to the remainder, with apparently similar fairness outcomes.
Critiques and technical vulnerabilities
- Several participants argue that sophisticated human adversaries will find exploits that simulations miss.
- Proposed “mortar and bricks” and concentric‑ring constructions show how contiguity can be abused to force the second mover to re‑assemble an original gerrymander.
- Donut-shaped districts are explicitly disallowed, but critics argue more subtle variants can achieve similar effects.
- Concern that heavy “cracking” and “packing,” especially around single urban centers, can limit what the combining party can fix.
- No protection against incumbent‑protection collusion by both parties.
Political and social feasibility
- Many doubt any party in power will voluntarily adopt a process that reduces its ability to gerrymander; incentives favor the status quo.
- Debate over whether “technical solutions to social problems” can work: some see them as essential (like voting itself), others as inadequate without broader depolarization.
Alternative reforms discussed
- Strong support from many for proportional representation and multi‑member districts (often with STV or mixed-member systems) as a more fundamental cure.
- Other ideas: algorithmic/geometric districting, canonical map‑drawing algorithms, larger legislatures to dilute district-level manipulation, non-geographic or voter‑chosen constituencies, and simply engaging more via primaries.