Rolling Airframe Missile

Navalgazing.net and Article Reception

• Many readers praise the blog’s name and writing, describing it as a deep “rabbit hole” of high‑quality naval content.
• Linked companion pieces on Phalanx and Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) are highlighted as especially good.
• One subthread briefly examines the blogger’s stated background (aerospace engineer, former battleship tour guide), generally treating them as technically competent, though not a formal historian.

Phalanx CIWS: Operation, Incidents, Limits

• Phalanx is described as a radar‑directed 20mm Gatling “last line of defense” gun; the white dome is the radar.
• Autonomous “it flies, it dies” mode exists but is reportedly too dangerous to use; a human is kept in the loop.
• Challenges: detecting sea‑skimming missiles in clutter, deciding when a target is actually destroyed, and vulnerability of the unarmored mount to debris.
• Historical incidents discussed:
  • Friendly fire on USS Missouri when another ship’s CIWS engaged Missouri’s chaff.
  • Confusion over whether CIWS was used in some modern engagements; one commenter clarifies that advertised “last line of defense machine guns” were in fact Phalanx itself.
• CIWS engagement range is limited by hit probability and dispersion, not raw ballistic reach.

RAM and Rolling/Spin-Stabilized Missiles

• Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) is noted as having largely supplanted CIWS on many ships due to longer effective range.
• Discussion of its guidance: early versions used two fins on a single actuator plus roll to synthesize control; newer Block 2 has four independently actuated fins but still benefits from spin stabilization for fault tolerance.
• Similar rolling or clutch‑based schemes in other guided munitions are mentioned as examples of clever missile design.

Missiles, Moskva, and Surface Ship Vulnerability

• Several comments argue that modern layered defenses (Aegis, SAMs, CIWS/RAM, decoys) should make a ship like Moskva very hard to hit; its loss is attributed in the discussion to poor readiness, inoperable systems, and possible complacency.
• Historical parallels (USS Stark, HMS Sheffield, V‑1 defense, kamikazes) are used to argue that missiles and aircraft have long threatened surface ships but have not made them obsolete.

Drones and Short‑Range Air Defense

• Multiple commenters question how traditional CIWS/RAM fare against cheap, slow or swarming drones.
• Challenges noted: radar clutter, slow or small targets that don’t stand out on Doppler, base perimeters being large, and collateral damage from falling bullets.
• Existing or analogous systems are cited: land‑based Phalanx (C‑RAM), mobile SHORAD systems, German Gepard, and newer gun‑based anti‑drone concepts.
• Self‑destructing air‑burst rounds are mentioned as one mitigation for stray‑round risk, though with tradeoffs (e.g., fire hazard, not obviously suitable for civilian use).

Lasers, Smart Munitions, and Future Trends

• Lasers are discussed as a promising, cheaper‑per‑shot answer to small drones and rockets, but with acknowledged weather limits (e.g., fog).
• Some mention “smart” gun munitions as a potential middle ground between bullets and missiles.
• Overall theme: defenses are evolving from pure guns to layered mixes of missiles, guns, decoys, and emerging lasers, with cost and saturation attacks as central concerns.

Automation, IFF, and Risk Management

• Commenters debate adding more identification or coordination (e.g., avoiding friendly chaff) to systems like Phalanx versus keeping them as simple “anything in this box dies” devices.
• Consensus in the thread leans toward always keeping a human in the loop for lethal autonomy, while recognizing that very short reaction times push designs toward greater automation.