What if I’m wrong? (2023)
How we handle being wrong – and even knowing what “wrong” means – runs through this exchange on philosophy, science, and everyday reasoning. Commenters contrast productive error (like Ptolemy’s astronomy or software prototypes that map a problem space) with “not even wrong” claims that can’t be falsified, probing the role of evidence, analogies, and community norms in separating useful models from pseudoscience and weasel words such as “best practice.” The thread also branches into how these issues play out in religion and atheism, the limits of personal experience as evidence, and Daniel Dennett’s idea of “distributed understanding,” where intellectual humility and informed peers help correct individual blind spots.
Meaning of “wrong” and “not even wrong”
- Multiple views on “not even wrong”:
- As unfalsifiable or not making a clear truth-claim, so outside scientific evaluation.
- As a confused or ill-posed statement (e.g., mixing unrelated ideas).
- As “beside the point” or correct but irrelevant.
- Contrast between historically fruitful “wrong” models (e.g., old astronomy) and less testable frameworks (e.g., classical psychoanalysis).
- Some argue applying falsifiability criteria to psychoanalysis and similar practices is itself a category error; they should be treated more like functional tools than science.
Value of being wrong and prototyping
- Strong analogy to software engineering:
- First implementations are often “wrong but useful” prototypes that surface constraints and tensions.
- Early, flawed systems can still save large amounts of time for later, better designs.
- Similar idea in planning and emergency management: detailed plans often fail literally but make you understand the problem space.
Argumentation: best practices, weasel words, analogies
- “Best practice” frequently used as a shield for opinions; several commenters insist it should invite “according to whom, in what context?”.
- “Weasel words” and anonymous authority can mislead, but anonymity also has legitimate uses (journalism, protecting individuals).
- Debate over analogies:
- Helpful for intuition and teaching, poor as standalone evidence.
- Can support opposite conclusions depending on what features are mapped.
- Some see heavy reliance on analogy as a sign of shallow understanding; others note that analogies can expose inconsistencies and shift emotional intuitions.
Being corrected, opinions, and learning
- Several participants describe becoming comfortable with being wrong and seeking “constructive wrongness” that improves their models or work.
- Concern that online corrections often target trivial or adjacent points “for sport” rather than furthering understanding.
- Discussion about how often one should change opinions:
- Never revising views is seen as a red flag.
- Memory, embarrassment, and self-narrative complicate recognizing past errors.
Community, expertise, and distributed understanding
- Some see the forum (and similar communities) as examples of “distributed understanding” where laypeople and specialists cross-correct each other.
- Others are skeptical, noting:
- Many posts are confident but shallow rephrasings of second-hand rhetoric.
- Correct-sounding but wrong claims may go unchallenged if no true expert is present.
- Still, there is appreciation for an environment where being wrong is allowed without immediate exclusion.
Reactions to the essay and the philosopher’s stance
- Mixed response to the essay’s self-skepticism:
- Some read it as genuinely grappling with the possibility of a “colossal mistake” while continuing to use a productive philosophical framework.
- Others see it as a subtle self-congratulation: enough respected thinkers agree with the program that deep doubt is relegated to a “back burner.”
- The described practice of testing book drafts in seminars is praised as a way to institutionalize correction and invite critique.