Institutions try to preserve the problem to which they are the solution
Institutions created to solve a problem often evolve to preserve it instead, argue readers responding to an article on the “Shirky principle.” Many point to examples ranging from tax software, healthcare, homelessness services and defense contracting to unions, NGOs and large corporations, noting how funding models, regulatory capture and perverse incentives reward managing problems rather than eliminating them. Others stress that this is not inevitable: clear exit strategies, strong competition, better metric design and time-limited mandates can curb the tendency of bureaucracies to prioritize their own survival over their original mission.
Scope and Validity of the Shirky Principle
- Many agree the pattern is real but not universal: some orgs do eliminate problems or pivot to new missions.
- Several argue it’s basically a restatement of “perverse incentives” / “moral hazard,” or Pournelle’s Iron Law of Bureaucracy, not something fundamentally new.
- Others stress survivorship bias: organizations that don’t protect their niche disappear, so we mostly see the self‑preserving ones.
Incentives, Money, and Power
- Core theme: people’s pay, status, and identity are tied to the problem’s continued existence, so solutions that truly end it are disfavored.
- This is seen in charities, NGOs, homelessness services, “poverty industrial complex,” healthcare, and defense contracting: much revenue depends on persistent problems.
- Several note that profit motive isn’t required; prestige, headcount, and bureaucratic power can play the same role.
Government vs. Private Sector
- Thread splits on whether the article over-targets government while using mostly private-sector examples.
- Some claim public institutions are worse because they don’t “go out of business”; others counter that corporations are just as bad via regulatory capture, oligopolies, and rent‑seeking.
- Examples cited on both sides: tax-filing companies, US healthcare/insurance, defense contractors, unions, UNRWA, homelessness NGOs, TSA, waste management, etc.
Examples, Misexamples, and Related Ideas
- Cobra/rats bounties and similar stories are often cited; some argue these are clearer cases of perverse incentives/Goodhart’s law, not institutions deliberately preserving problems.
- Other references: spam vs. anti‑spam industry, “war on drugs,” tax-prep companies blocking IRS simplification, NGOs in poverty or refugee contexts, and homelessness funding in US cities.
- Counterexamples: smallpox eradication, certain disease foundations and campaigns that achieved goals and disbanded or cleanly repurposed.
Individuals and Internal Dynamics
- Several note that individuals behave similarly: they protect pet projects and sunk costs, resist pivots after investing years of effort, and fear job loss if their work succeeds “too well.”
- A recurring observation: two classes inside orgs—those devoted to the mission vs. those devoted to the organization; the latter tend to capture control over time.
Proposed Mitigations
- Suggested levers: time‑limited mandates, “exit strategies,” no‑cure‑no‑pay models, fixed or declining subsidies, stronger competition, explicit shutdown criteria, and better incentive design.
- Others warn this is hard: metrics get gamed (Goodhart’s law), oversight layers themselves become new self‑preserving systems.