Commission opens non-compliance investigations against Alphabet, Apple and Meta

EU regulators have opened non-compliance probes into Alphabet, Apple and Meta under the new Digital Markets Act, focusing on self‑preferencing, app store “steering,” Apple’s tightly controlled iOS ecosystem, and Meta’s “pay or consent” tracking model. Commenters broadly welcome tougher enforcement on gatekeepers but argue over whether measures like browser choice screens, sideloading rules and cookie/consent regimes are precise, effective protections or heavy-handed interventions that risk entrenching existing giants. The thread widens into a debate about privacy vs. ad-funded “free” services, why Microsoft and game consoles are treated differently, and whether stronger regulation ultimately curbs abuse of market power or stifles innovation and user choice.

Cookie consent, tracking, and browser-level controls

  • Many see cookie pop‑ups as failed or bad‑faith GDPR compliance: dark patterns, huge “partner” lists, and significant time waste.
  • Strong support for a browser‑level, enforceable “tracking preference” (with per‑site options) that websites must respect; some want it mandated by EU law.
  • Others note cookies are less central than device/browser fingerprinting and Google’s own built‑in tracking; GDPR in principle already covers all personal data.
  • ePrivacy Regulation is cited as the intended fix for cookie fatigue, but it has stalled; draft text suggests exactly this browser‑setting approach.

Why Microsoft (and consoles) mostly aren’t in scope

  • Commenters ask why Microsoft isn’t in the DMA investigation; answers:
    • Windows already allows sideloading and competing stores; Microsoft has a long history of prior EU antitrust cases and adjusted earlier.
    • Xbox isn’t big enough in the EEA to meet “gatekeeper” thresholds; DMA is size‑triggered.
  • However, Microsoft is under separate EU antitrust probes (e.g., 365 + Teams), and Windows is recognized as a DMA gatekeeper, just not currently under this non‑compliance investigation.
  • Game consoles generally are seen as tightly locked but outside DMA scope for now; there’s debate whether opening them up would help or hurt consumers and indie devs.

Regulating big platforms and the DMA’s precision

  • Broad support for regulating dominant platforms because of network effects, gatekeeping, and the ability to “erase” people from digital life.
  • Some argue continuous investigations are necessary “trust and verify,” not evidence of a vague law.
  • Others see the DMA as under‑specified and expect firms to push to the outer legal boundary, forcing long investigations to define what’s actually prohibited.
  • There’s discussion of “malicious compliance”: companies technically ticking boxes while increasing user pain to build political pressure against the law.

Apple, app stores, browsers, and EU exit talk

  • Apple’s DMA response is widely viewed as hostile: new fee structures, restrictions on alternative stores, and limited practical sideloading.
  • Many expect the Commission to treat these as attempts to defeat the purpose of the DMA (e.g., high “core technology” fees, complex contracts).
  • The browser‑choice screen is scrutinized: ordering, inclusion, Safari’s special treatment, “Not now” button, and continued privileging of Safari in system UI.
  • A few speculate about Apple leaving the EU; most think EU revenue share and strategic risk of ceding the market make exit unrealistic.