Commission opens non-compliance investigations against Alphabet, Apple and Meta

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Cookie consent, tracking, and browser-level controls

  • Many see cookie pop‑ups as failed or bad‑faith GDPR compliance: dark patterns, huge “partner” lists, and significant time waste.
  • Strong support for a browser‑level, enforceable “tracking preference” (with per‑site options) that websites must respect; some want it mandated by EU law.
  • Others note cookies are less central than device/browser fingerprinting and Google’s own built‑in tracking; GDPR in principle already covers all personal data.
  • ePrivacy Regulation is cited as the intended fix for cookie fatigue, but it has stalled; draft text suggests exactly this browser‑setting approach.

Why Microsoft (and consoles) mostly aren’t in scope

  • Commenters ask why Microsoft isn’t in the DMA investigation; answers:
    • Windows already allows sideloading and competing stores; Microsoft has a long history of prior EU antitrust cases and adjusted earlier.
    • Xbox isn’t big enough in the EEA to meet “gatekeeper” thresholds; DMA is size‑triggered.
  • However, Microsoft is under separate EU antitrust probes (e.g., 365 + Teams), and Windows is recognized as a DMA gatekeeper, just not currently under this non‑compliance investigation.
  • Game consoles generally are seen as tightly locked but outside DMA scope for now; there’s debate whether opening them up would help or hurt consumers and indie devs.

Regulating big platforms and the DMA’s precision

  • Broad support for regulating dominant platforms because of network effects, gatekeeping, and the ability to “erase” people from digital life.
  • Some argue continuous investigations are necessary “trust and verify,” not evidence of a vague law.
  • Others see the DMA as under‑specified and expect firms to push to the outer legal boundary, forcing long investigations to define what’s actually prohibited.
  • There’s discussion of “malicious compliance”: companies technically ticking boxes while increasing user pain to build political pressure against the law.

Apple, app stores, browsers, and EU exit talk

  • Apple’s DMA response is widely viewed as hostile: new fee structures, restrictions on alternative stores, and limited practical sideloading.
  • Many expect the Commission to treat these as attempts to defeat the purpose of the DMA (e.g., high “core technology” fees, complex contracts).
  • The browser‑choice screen is scrutinized: ordering, inclusion, Safari’s special treatment, “Not now” button, and continued privileging of Safari in system UI.
  • A few speculate about Apple leaving the EU; most think EU revenue share and strategic risk of ceding the market make exit unrealistic.