How The Pentagon learned to use targeted ads to find its targets
Modern ad-tech and location data from everyday apps like Grindr, Strava, Snapchat, and weather services are being repurposed as powerful surveillance tools, including by the U.S. military and other state actors. Commenters describe how geofencing, real-time bidding, and mobile identifiers can reveal sensitive sites, troop movements, and individual routines, even when phones are banned from secure areas or advertising IDs are reset. The exchange raises broader concerns about national security, personal privacy, and whether meaningful protection is possible without fundamentally curbing the targeted advertising ecosystem.
Scope of Adtech-Based Surveillance
- Commenters familiar with the field say the article’s methods are realistic and have been known inside industry for years.
- Adtech (especially RTB) is described as more powerful for mass surveillance than many traditional military tools.
- Location data from apps (e.g., Grindr, Strava, Snapchat, TikTok, Life360, weather apps) can be repurposed for intelligence, law enforcement, and even targeting individuals.
- A related book (“Means of Control”) is mentioned; the Wired piece is said to be adapted from it.
Phones, Bases, and Operational Security
- Even where phones are banned from secure areas, they usually sit in cars or lockers nearby, which is still enough for location tracking.
- Past leaks: Strava and VK activity have exposed US and Russian bases; anecdote of a Russian officer allegedly targeted via Strava.
- Discussion of a training exercise where commercial cell data helped plug an air-defense gap.
- Many argue phone bans are hard to enforce: troops want contact with families; even in Ukraine, cellphone discipline is difficult.
Proposals and Skepticism
- Ideas: completely ban personal phones from federal workplaces; use remote parking plus shuttles; create NSA-managed secure phones or OS.
- Counterarguments: such patterns would themselves be statistically unique and easily detectable; burdens on employees and hiring; easier to ban phones in more areas than to dismantle ad markets.
- Some hope national security concerns could drive abolition of targeted ads; others note governments benefit from this data.
How Targeted Ads Reveal Location
- Ad impressions expose IP addresses and often fine-grained geolocation through geofenced campaigns.
- Once a device appears in a geofence, it can be retargeted elsewhere.
- Geofencing and sensor-style counts can estimate numbers of people in sensitive areas without explicit identifiers.
Privacy Controls and Mitigations
- Platform tools: per-app location and network controls on Android/iOS; deleting or resetting ad IDs (with skepticism about how anonymous that really is).
- Some use custom ROMs (e.g., GrapheneOS, LineageOS) or firewalls to restrict telemetry.
- Techniques like HTTPS inspection (e.g., via Proxyman) reveal extensive data exfiltration by many apps.
- Opinions split on recommendations like using Google services for security vs. distrust of Google’s data collection.
Weather Apps and Other High-Risk Apps
- Weather apps are repeatedly cited as heavy location data sellers; ICE reportedly used such data on migrants.
- Suggestions: use OS default weather apps, privacy-friendlier services (e.g., one specific “Windy” variant), or browser-based forecasts; avoid granting precise location.
- Some debate Apple’s motives/data needs and the accuracy and privacy of its weather app.
Legal and Regulatory Notes
- GDPR is raised regarding IP and RTB, but commenters note extensive ongoing RTB leakage and doubt intelligence agencies’ compliance.