.name Termination

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Verisign’s plan to terminate all third‑level `.name` domains (like `firstname.lastname.name`) — despite many being prepaid years into the future — is raising alarms about contractual reliability and the stability of internet naming. Commenters argue the move contradicts ICANN’s mission to ensure secure, stable identifiers, exposes users to email and identity hijacking when the underlying second‑level domains are resold, and highlights long‑standing concerns about Verisign’s conduct. The episode also fuels broader skepticism about non‑core TLDs and renews calls for treating critical naming infrastructure more like a regulated public utility than a profit center.

What Verisign is doing and impact

  • Verisign is discontinuing all third‑level .name registrations (e.g. first.last.name) while keeping second‑level domains (e.g. last.name) intact.
  • Existing third‑level domains will be terminated on a short timeline, even if prepaid many years ahead, breaking websites, email addresses, and device configurations tied to them.
  • Once the third‑level names are dropped, their corresponding second‑level domains (e.g. fraser.name) are expected to become available to whoever registers them first, raising hijacking and extortion concerns.

Reactions to Verisign and ICANN

  • Many commenters describe Verisign’s behavior as negligent or exploitative, pointing to a history of controversies.
  • ICANN is criticized for approving the change and accepting Verisign’s claim that it has “no effect on the life cycle of domain names,” which many see as word‑games.
  • Several draw parallels to the blocked attempt to sell .org to a private equity firm, suggesting regulatory capture and inadequate public‑interest protection.

How .name’s structure worked

  • Originally, .name was designed for personal names: only third‑level domains like first.last.name were offered, often with email forwarding.
  • Later, second‑level registrations (last.name) were allowed, but existing third‑level users did not gain rights to “upgrade” to the second level, leading to long‑standing frustration.
  • Some users own only second‑level .name and are unaffected; others had no idea third‑level sales existed.

Security, cookies, and technical quirks

  • The mix of registry‑sold third‑level and normal second‑level domains makes .name a long‑standing edge case for the Public Suffix List, cookie scoping, and origin boundaries.
  • Commenters debate whether this PSL headache is a genuine driver or just a pretext for monetizing second‑level names as “premium” inventory.

Legal, contractual, and consumer‑rights angles

  • People question how a paid‑through date can be unilaterally shortened without full refunds or additional compensation for reliance damage.
  • Some suggest class actions or complaints to regulators (e.g. California Attorney General), arguing this contradicts ICANN’s stated mission of stability and security.

Alternatives and broader reflections

  • Suggestions include: stop new third‑level registrations but honor existing ones; auto‑grant second‑level domains where only a single third‑level exists; or phase out only via non‑renewal.
  • Broader debates cover: whether unusual TLDs are inherently risky; whether to stick to .com/ccTLDs; the fragility of email and identity tied to leased domains; and decentralized naming attempts (ENS, Namecoin, new projects) versus the need to fix centralized governance.