U.S. is said to open criminal inquiry into Boeing
U.S. authorities have opened a criminal inquiry into Boeing following the mid‑air panel blowout on an Alaska Airlines 737 MAX 9, intensifying scrutiny of the company’s safety culture and leadership. Commenters debate whether liability will reach executives or stop at frontline workers, how to balance “blameless” NTSB investigations with prosecutions, and the extent to which regulatory capture, outsourcing, and financialized management have undermined aviation safety. Many are skeptical meaningful accountability will follow, citing Boeing’s defense ties and “too big to fail” status, while others argue that strong penalties and structural reforms are now unavoidable to restore trust.
Accountability and Criminal Liability
- Many argue the issues are systemic and trace back to Boeing’s board and C‑suite; calls for firings, personal liability, and even jail time for executives.
- Others caution against pre‑assigning blame before investigations conclude, emphasizing due process and distinguishing negligence from criminality.
- Some fear only low-level mechanics or first-line managers will be prosecuted as scapegoats, while leadership escapes consequences.
- Debate over whether engineers and licensed professionals (e.g., DERs, PEs) also bear direct ethical and legal responsibility to the public.
Blameless Investigation vs. Prosecution
- Several comments defend the NTSB’s “blameless” fact‑finding model as essential to understanding root causes and improving safety.
- Others note NTSB already complains Boeing is not fully cooperating, arguing this justifies parallel criminal probes by DOJ.
- Clarification that “blameless” means the goal is systemic learning, not that nobody is ever held accountable afterward.
Regulators, Capture, and International Pressure
- Strong concern about FAA delegating critical oversight to industry, limited in‑house expertise, and potential regulatory capture.
- Some note FAA’s budget has grown, questioning “underfunding” narratives; others emphasize cultural and structural problems instead.
- Discussion of revolving doors between regulators and industry, and conflicts of interest.
- EASA and other foreign regulators seen as an independent check; erosion of FAA–EASA trust after 737 MAX raises stakes for Boeing.
Culture, Outsourcing, and Process Breakdown
- Widespread view that Boeing’s problems reflect broader US corporate culture: financialization, cost‑cutting, outsourcing, and weakened safety culture.
- Door plug incident framed as a quality/process failure: missing bolts, missing or mis‑classified documentation (“open” vs “remove”), possible workarounds to avoid paperwork.
- Outsourcing to Spirit AeroSystems and others seen as a root cause; Boeing’s attempt to re‑acquire Spirit viewed as implicit admission.
Risk, Public Perception, and Market Response
- Some passengers now avoid 737 MAX via flight search filters, though aircraft type can change and airlines already own much of the fleet.
- Multiple comments stress that flying remains statistically very safe, but perception is shifting as incidents and “near misses” accumulate.
Systemic and Political Dimensions
- Boeing described as “too big to fail” and strategically vital; skepticism that the government will permit outcomes that truly threaten the company.
- Broader critiques of shareholder primacy, lobbying, Citizens United–style money in politics, and “power without accountability” across corporations and government.