U.S. is said to open criminal inquiry into Boeing

Accountability and Criminal Liability

• Many argue the issues are systemic and trace back to Boeing’s board and C‑suite; calls for firings, personal liability, and even jail time for executives.
• Others caution against pre‑assigning blame before investigations conclude, emphasizing due process and distinguishing negligence from criminality.
• Some fear only low-level mechanics or first-line managers will be prosecuted as scapegoats, while leadership escapes consequences.
• Debate over whether engineers and licensed professionals (e.g., DERs, PEs) also bear direct ethical and legal responsibility to the public.

Blameless Investigation vs. Prosecution

• Several comments defend the NTSB’s “blameless” fact‑finding model as essential to understanding root causes and improving safety.
• Others note NTSB already complains Boeing is not fully cooperating, arguing this justifies parallel criminal probes by DOJ.
• Clarification that “blameless” means the goal is systemic learning, not that nobody is ever held accountable afterward.

Regulators, Capture, and International Pressure

• Strong concern about FAA delegating critical oversight to industry, limited in‑house expertise, and potential regulatory capture.
• Some note FAA’s budget has grown, questioning “underfunding” narratives; others emphasize cultural and structural problems instead.
• Discussion of revolving doors between regulators and industry, and conflicts of interest.
• EASA and other foreign regulators seen as an independent check; erosion of FAA–EASA trust after 737 MAX raises stakes for Boeing.

Culture, Outsourcing, and Process Breakdown

• Widespread view that Boeing’s problems reflect broader US corporate culture: financialization, cost‑cutting, outsourcing, and weakened safety culture.
• Door plug incident framed as a quality/process failure: missing bolts, missing or mis‑classified documentation (“open” vs “remove”), possible workarounds to avoid paperwork.
• Outsourcing to Spirit AeroSystems and others seen as a root cause; Boeing’s attempt to re‑acquire Spirit viewed as implicit admission.

Risk, Public Perception, and Market Response

• Some passengers now avoid 737 MAX via flight search filters, though aircraft type can change and airlines already own much of the fleet.
• Multiple comments stress that flying remains statistically very safe, but perception is shifting as incidents and “near misses” accumulate.

Systemic and Political Dimensions

• Boeing described as “too big to fail” and strategically vital; skepticism that the government will permit outcomes that truly threaten the company.
• Broader critiques of shareholder primacy, lobbying, Citizens United–style money in politics, and “power without accountability” across corporations and government.