David Frankel is a man on a mission against robocalls

Original Article ↗ Hacker News Discussion ↗

Robocalls in the United States are seen as a systemic failure of the phone network, driven by perverse economic incentives, weak regulation, and FCC regulatory capture that leaves telecom operators little motivation to curb abuse. Commenters contrast this with Europe, where caller-pays models, stricter rules on cold calling, and higher per-message costs make large-scale spam campaigns less viable, and note that technical measures like STIR/SHAKEN only partially address spoofing. Many have adapted by screening or silencing most calls, worrying especially about the impact on elderly people vulnerable to scams and debating whether the long-term answer is stricter liability and per-call charges, carrier-level blocking, or abandoning legacy telephony in favor of authenticated, internet-based communication.

International differences in robocalls

  • Multiple commenters from Germany, UK, Ireland, and Czechia report few or no robocalls; some Germans say “almost never,” others say “daily,” so experience is mixed.
  • Explanations offered:
    • Germany bans unsolicited commercial calls and imposes heavy fines.
    • In much of Europe, the caller pays mobile termination fees, making mass spam expensive.
    • In the U.S., historically the receiver paid airtime and now most plans are “unlimited,” so it’s effectively free to spam.
    • English’s reach makes broad-based scams more efficient; some note “niche” languages are less targeted, though German’s “niche” status is disputed.

Regulation, capture, and telco incentives

  • Several posts argue FCC regulatory capture and telco lobbying delayed or weakened action.
  • Telcos earn from both sides of a spam call (originator and recipient/termination), so high volume can be profitable.
  • Some believe carriers could market “spam-free” service and win customers, but an oligopoly and political robocall use reduce incentives.

Technical measures and their limits

  • STIR/SHAKEN is seen as only partially effective:
    • Needs end-to-end IP; legacy TDM hops strip information.
    • Robocallers can still get calls signed via their originating providers.
    • Devices may show attestation levels, but this is limited in practice.
  • Caller-ID spoofing remains rampant; blocking by area code is often defeated.

User-level defenses and behaviors

  • Common strategies:
    • Silence unknown callers, use focus modes, and whitelist only close contacts.
    • Rely on carrier and handset spam filters; some report near-zero spam as a result.
    • Use call-screening/AI secretary features (e.g., “Call Screen”) or apps that block/decoy spammers.
    • Landline “CAPTCHA” systems that require pressing a random digit reportedly eliminate most robocalls.

Social and psychological impacts

  • Many now treat unsolicited calls as inherently suspect and prefer asynchronous text/email.
  • Some view phone calls as an intrusive interruption; others defend voice as richer and more accessible communication.
  • Elderly people are singled out as heavily victimized; anecdotes of families losing large sums underscore that the phone system is “entirely broken” for them.

Proposed systemic fixes

  • Ideas include:
    • Making callers pay for the full path of a call, with per-call or per-report microcharges.
    • Allowing users to block by country, carrier, or any call with non-domestic hops.
    • Building a new, authenticated, certificate-based telephony system over existing infrastructure.
  • Feasibility is questioned due to SIP/email gateways, legacy infrastructure, business incentives, and political will.