How Quickly Can the DoD Rebuild and Recast the Munitions Industrial Base?

Cruise Missile Costs and Design Tradeoffs

• OP questions why Tomahawks still cost ~$2.5M when guidance, GPS, and computing are now cheap.
• Replies stress cost drivers: custom turbofan engines, high‑end inertial navigation, active radar, long‑term storability in harsh environments, low production volumes, and extensive qualification.
• Some argue cost could be lower by relaxing requirements (component derating, temperature, MTBF) and adopting “new space” logic: accept higher failure rates and just fire more. Others say Tomahawks’ precision and low collateral damage requirements justify “exquisite” engineering.
• Anduril and similar firms are cited as “creative destruction,” but critics note their missiles (e.g., Barracuda‑type) are less capable (shorter range, smaller warhead) and not obviously cheaper per delivered effect.

Cheap Drones, “Castles vs Cannons,” and Ukraine

• Thread contrasts expensive “castle” systems (US high‑end hardware) with cheap “cannons” (drones and basic cruise missiles).
• Ukraine and Russia both use large numbers of cheap drones and mid‑range cruise missiles; some Ukrainian systems are said to rely heavily on Chinese components and decentralized manufacturing, with rapid frontline feedback loops.
• US copies and adapts cheap Iranian‑style drones; this is framed as rational imitation rather than shameful “copying.”
• Debate over how much corruption Ukraine faces; some see 2% of budget lost as low for a war state, others say war is always fertile ground for graft.

Offense–Defense Economics and Missile Defense

• Multiple comments note that interceptors are often more expensive than attacking missiles, biasing the economics toward offense.
• Some argue what matters is value of what’s protected vs. interceptor cost; others counter that against a peer, cheaper offensive missiles can simply overwhelm any interceptor stockpile.
• Examples discussed: THAAD at ~$13M per shot; air defense doctrine historically aimed to blunt initial strikes, not provide permanent shields.
• Perun’s analyses (YouTube) are cited on unfavorable cost curves for missile defense and questions about the value of stockpiling interceptors vs. hardening or dispersing assets.

Future Industrial Base and Surge Capacity

• Several commenters argue US procurement is optimized for peacetime, high‑end systems and is bad at rapidly scaling “good enough” weapons.
• Suggestions include splitting procurement into high/low‑end families so low‑end can be surged via generic manufacturing, as seen with Ukrainian drones.
• Others highlight constraints: specialized jigs and tooling, slow certification of chips, reliance on foreign electronics, and political desire to spread production across many districts, raising costs.
• Debate over whether it’s better to keep constant high spend vs. lower steady budgets plus proven surge capacity; “how to surge, concretely?” remains unclear.

Corruption, Incentives, and War Profiteering

• Strong claims that US defense is structurally corrupt: profits and political pork (parts made in every district) drive decisions more than military need.
• Counterpoints note that sometimes “scandals” like expensive hammers or toilet seats had technical justifications, and that fraud controls intentionally slow procurement.
• Some want war costs borne directly by the wealthy or war supporters to realign incentives; others note elites can dodge drafts and shield their children.
• View that wars and emergencies reliably generate “hand‑waving opportunities” for graft appears widely shared.

US Role, Blowback, and Ethics

• Several comments criticize US post‑WWII posture as more “gangster” than “policeman,” citing coups, genocides supported indirectly, and repeated wars of choice.
• Others see hegemony as inherently about maintaining a global status quo via “forever war,” with human‑rights rhetoric as PR.
• Some argue best defense is political: strong democratic institutions, journalism, trade, and “merciful immigration,” rather than ever‑more munitions.

Domestic Risk, Civil War, and Non‑Military Threats

• A subthread questions whether DoD is planning for the “wrong wars,” pointing out US Civil War as the bloodiest and today’s high domestic gun deaths.
• Debate compares firearm deaths vs. heat deaths in Europe (and the role of air conditioning), with pushback on how to weigh “life‑years lost” vs. raw mortality.
• One line of argument: internal cohesion and civil peace may matter more for security than additional missiles.

Environmental and Social Costs of Munitions Production

• Example given of a WWII‑era munitions plant that permanently damaged prime farmland and groundwater.
• Concerns that current “boom times” for arms producers mean stable incentives to under‑invest in environmental protection and worker welfare while maximizing political lobbying.

Ambiguities and Open Questions

• Unclear to what extent Ukraine was “denied” Western innovation pipelines vs. simply moving faster on its own.
• Degree to which new tech firms can truly undercut legacy primes on cost remains contested.
• No consensus on practical mechanisms to maintain idle surge capacity without constant high spending and entrenched interests.