FAA lets Boeing sign off on 737 MAX, 787 airworthiness certificates again
The FAA has restored Boeing’s authority to issue airworthiness certificates for its 737 MAX and 787 aircraft, reigniting concerns about self-certification after past fatal crashes and quality-control failures. Commenters question whether a manufacturer should effectively police itself, pointing to regulatory capture, pressure from capital markets, and the gap between formal safety processes and real-world incentives. Others note that passengers have limited practical ability to avoid specific aircraft types, and that market or international regulators like the EU may be the only effective counterweights.
Regulatory change & immediate reactions
- Many see restoring Boeing’s authority to issue airworthiness certificates as “repeating past errors,” citing regulatory capture and corruption.
- Others note that delegation to manufacturers has been common for decades; they see the core issue as Boeing’s internal culture and processes, not the delegation model itself.
- Some commenters ask for clarification and get confirmation that Boeing’s authority is only for individual aircraft airworthiness, not design approval.
What “airworthiness certificates” cover
- Several posts distinguish:
- Type certificate = design approval.
- Airworthiness certificate = each plane conforms to the approved design and applicable directives.
- The MAX crashes were tied to design (MCAS), not issues that routine airworthiness inspections would catch.
- Suspension of Boeing’s authority was linked both to MAX design changes and later 787 production-quality problems.
Quality, design, and past incidents
- Commenters argue the 737 MAX airframe diverged so far from the original 737 that it should have been treated as a new type, with more stringent oversight.
- The 787 door plug incident is cited as evidence of compromised quality control and insufficient internal inspections.
- Some note that FAA’s criteria and metrics for suspending and then restoring Boeing’s authority were never clearly articulated, calling the process partially “theatre.”
Corporate incentives and “financialization” debate
- One side says Boeing’s problems stem from “obscene financialization”: shareholder-primacy, short-term metrics, and pressure on engineers and QA.
- The opposing view claims profit-driven corner-cutting is as old as commerce and that “financialization” is an unhelpful buzzword.
- Supporters of the term describe it as financial metrics increasingly steering technical decisions, sometimes to unsafe outcomes.
Role of EU and other regulators
- Some call for the EU to block 737 MAX/787 from its airspace, questioning whether it will show “backbone.”
- Others counter that the EU can be an effective regulator (e.g., on USB-C and battery rules), though its power is often slow and bureaucratic.
Consumer choice and aircraft avoidance
- A number of commenters avoid Boeing or 737 MAX where possible, preferring Airbus-only carriers.
- Others argue meaningful choice is limited: many routes are monopolized, aircraft can be swapped last-minute, and “no 737 MAX” filters don’t exist.
- Some list airlines that operate only Airbus fleets as practical workarounds; others note this is much harder in the US.
Trust, safety expectations, and policy ideas
- Sentiment ranges from “statistically still very safe” to “any single crash is unacceptable if driven by shareholder pressure.”
- Proposals include: banning manufacturer self-certification, embedding fully independent inspectors, and using stronger international checks.
- It remains unclear from the thread exactly what evidence convinced the FAA that Boeing’s internal processes are now adequate.